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"Regional trade agreements require governments to have a
conscience and to hold a mirror to themselves." Gabriela Llobet
Yglesias, Vice Minister of Trade, Costa Rica'
I. BACKGROUND: DIRECT LINKAGES BETWEEN TRADE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
In the 2003 Conference on Legal and Policy Issues in the Americas and
in courses and seminars taught at the University of Florida College of Law
since 200 1,2 the College's International Trade Law Program has explored
the more visible and controversial linkages between international trade law
and non-trade issues that span a broad range of vital interests that may
collectively be described as human rights law.
We have addressed the widespread criticism that international trade
rules are insensitive to basic human rights and that globalization has done
1. Minister Llobet was referring to the effect of transparency, notice, and publication
provisions in regional economic arrangements during the Economic Integration Workshop,
Conference on Legal and Policy Issues in the Americas, June 25, 2004, San Jose, Costa Rica (notes,
on file with the author).
2. International trade law, international trade and the environment, dispute settlement under
international trade and investment agreements, international trade and human rights (with Levin
Mabie & Levin Professor of Law Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol), and international trade and
human rights in the Americas (also with Hemdndez-Truyol).
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little with its enormous power to preserve exhaustible natural resources
and otherwise promote sustainable development,3 to alleviate the gap
between rich and poor,4 to encourage states to grant their citizens basic
human rights contained in the U.N. Covenant on Human Rights and other
treaties, to resolve the often conflicting policies underlying essential
human rights and trade goals, and, in general, to integrate trade and critical
human rights law on the global front.
Among other things, we concluded,5 first, that the World Trade
Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
primarily because of their single-minded pursuit of non-discrimination in
trade and the surprising effectiveness of their dispute settlement systems
in corralling violators, have had outsized effects on the parameters of
national agendas for such human rights objectives as protection of the
environment and pursuit of sustainable development, furtherance of core
labor rights, and even promotion of other fundamental human rights
principles, including elimination of disease and drug plagues.
Second, we found that these "direct" linkages are inevitable as part and
parcel of the aftermath of international economic growth, because they
necessarily follow from increased - often arguably unsustainable - use of
natural resources, from higher - sometimes unacceptable - levels of
pollution, from conflicts - frequently unavoidable - between trade rules
and government attempts to promote sustainable development, and from
a broad cultural disconnect - extending to Babel-like differences in the
meaning of words - between multilateral human rights treaties and global
treaties regulating trade.
We concluded, third, that trade negotiators must ever be mindful that
global trade rules do not operate in a vacuum, but instead cohabit a world
of preexisting human rights laws - articulated most often by demands of
the labor and environment sectors, but underpinned by even more basic
human rights of individuals such as the right to education and freedom
3. As Swedish prime minister Goran Persson put it in a speech arguing for further expansion
of the European Union beyond the present twenty-five states, "trade and diplomacy will overtake
military muscle as the most important asset for gaining international influence." E.U. Observer
(May 12, 2004), available at http://euobserver.com/?aid=15642.
4. SARAi-iANDERSONETAL., FIELDGUIDETOTHEGLOBALECONOMY 62 (2000) (arguing that
because free trade widens the gap between rich and poor, social tensions are increased that "poison
the ground for democratic development," thus explaining World Bank data showing that certain
countries with the highest export growth rates are "far from free societies.").
5. See Berta Esperanza Hernmidez-Truyol, The Rule of Law and Human Rights, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 167, 191-92 (2004); Stephen J. Powell, The Place of Human Rights Law in World Trade
Organization Rules, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 219, 220 (2004).
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from oppression - that simply should not, in any sensible system of laws,
be contravened by narrow economic precepts.6
In other words, these intersections of trade and human rights - "the
two cutting edge and hugely active areas in global and local existence"7 -
are ignored only at the peril both of trade and human rights agendas.
II. SUMMARY: HIDDEN LINKAGES BETWEEN TRADE AND HuMAN RIGHTS
Our focus in this Essay is on the contribution of regional free trade
agreements (FTAs) - primarily the rich trove of such pacts found among
the nations of the Western Hemisphere - to the rule of law. The rule of
law, the definition of which in our usage includes the substantive
ingredients ofjustice and fairness, is basic to enjoyment of human rights,8
and FTAs in our experience have had pronounced effects on attainment of
rules-based governance. Our task is to explore specific ways in which
FTAs, through provisions that require governments to conduct their
activities through a more transparent and expeditious process, a process
that relies exclusively on an administrative record created with input from
all affected members of civil society, and one whose rules, as well as their
implementation by government agencies, are subject to substantive review
by an independent and accessible judiciary, contribute to enjoyment by
civil society in general, not solely to those involved in international trade,
of rules-based governance. We will examine primarily indirect linkages
between FTAs and the rule of law, that is, those secondary effects of trade
pacts that, while perhaps not unintended by negotiators, likely were not
among the overt bargaining chips exchanged to create the characteristic
balance of rights and obligations found in trade agreements.
These lesser-noted effects include provisions that encourage
transparency, accountability, and due process by governments. Dispute
settlement systems in FTAs similarly promote timeliness, inclusive record
keeping, and impartiality in the administrative decisional process. For
example, numerous provisions of a typical FTA require that rules
applicable to importers and investors be easily available and open to them,
and normally that any changes to such rules be adopted in a process that is
open to the affected public and takes account of public input.
6. Hernndez-Truyol, supra note 5, at 192.
7. Id. at 190.
8. Application of the rule of law is included, along with open and transparent civil
institutions, in the list of the trappings of democracy, which was affirmed as a human right by the
United Nations in 1999. C.H.R. Res. 1999/57/ U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/57 (1999); see DAVID
WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 540 (2001).
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The fact that decisions made by national authorities affecting importers
and investors will often be subject to dispute settlement under an FTA may
work a substantial change in the government's decision-making process.
For example, the responding government normally will want the dispute
settlement panel to have access to the "administrative record" upon which
the decision was based in order to show compliance with the treaty
provisions the complaining government has alleged were violated.
The fate of the agency decision will rely on the completeness of this
record in setting out the evidence relied upon and its relation to the trade
agreement's obligations. When effective dispute settlement is available in
a trade agreement, national authorities may have strong incentives to
follow a very different decisional process than previously may have been
required by domestic law to implement the agreement's obligations.
Creation of an administrative record anticipates, for example, that
evidence upon which the decision is based will be explicitly identified and
placed in the file of the measure, and mandates in addition that the analysis
made by the agency be committed to paper and assigned to the file. It is
easily seen that these steps transform the decision process into a rules-
based mechanism, rather than one that flows from the opinions of agency
officials alone, an approach that inevitably ensures greater openness in the
decision process for all affected interests, both foreign and domestic.
The dispute settlement mechanisms of FTAs, in fact, may serve also as
alternatives for foreign interests to less developed and robust judicial
systems in smaller economies. FTA processes for resolving interpretive
conflict are effective either in securing changes to national measures found
to be in violation or, if the losing party does not comply with the decision
by bringing its measure into compliance, provide for compensation to the
winning party or, if the level of compensation cannot be agreed, permit
retaliation by the winning party in the amount of the damage suffered by
its private companies in lost trade.
FTA dispute settlement also has measures designed to secure neutral
panelists to review the national measure, and usually provide sources of
law for the dispute panel to apply that are harmonized for FTA parties,
which may be a more business-friendly environment for a foreign interest
than national rules on the subject. Trade dispute settlement systems often
provide for expeditious relief, recognizing that, to a business engaged in
the fast-paced global market, slow resolution of conflict essentially
deprives the business of any relief at all.
These elements of a binding process for resolving commercial conflicts
may provide more meaningful relief than national courts for foreign
companies involved in trade with an FTA country that has imposed
measures allegedly inconsistent with FTA terms. In fact, trade agreements
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may directly mandate changes to national court systems, as is the case with
provisions requiring that review of governmental trade measures be made
by tribunals that are independent of the agency deciding the measure, such
as articles 13 and 23, respectively, of the WTO Anti-Dumping and
Subsidies Agreements. For these same reasons, trade dispute settlement
also may serve as a prototype for the further evolution of national judicial
systems in the FTA parties. In effect, this aspect translates into trade
dispute settlement making itself obsolete.
In sum, dispute settlement under the trade and investment provisions
of FTA's aims to eliminate any role for nationalism or other bias in
reviewing whether the border measure or other national decision is
consistent with the FTA's obligations, thus promoting a rules-based
approach to the national regulatory processes of the FTA partners. From
a somewhat broader perspective, the stability of national regulations
promoted by FTAs becomes an end in itself, because predictability is one
of the strongest motivators of businesses to trade with and invest in a
particular country. In order to continue the economic growth stimulated by
a predictable set of rules, nations may be encouraged to pursue a more
rules-based system of governance.
We undertake our study aware of a certain scepticism as to our premise.
Some argue that trade agreements have no legitimate role in examination
of progress in rule of law principles, either because (1) human rights issues
interfere with obtaining maximum economic benefit of the agreement; or
(2) rule of law deficiencies, whether reflected in weak judiciaries or
corrupt licensing systems, persist because powerful interests want them
that way, and no glancing blow from an impartiality provision in an FTA
will change that weakness in the system; or (3) social developments such
as rules-based governance, like other aspects of nation-building,
legitimately may be accomplished only from within the country, although,
admittedly, outside forces (such as FTAs) can facilitate the process.9
III. INTRODUCTION: HUMAN RIGHTS MOTIVATION FOR REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS
We continue in this Essay our study of the human rights dimension of
trade by isolating more indirect and non-obvious ties between the two legal
regimes.
9. Statements by participants in 2004 Conference on Legal and Policy Issues in the
Americas, San Josd, Costa Rica, June 25, 2004 (notes, on file with author).
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Promotion of the rule of law consistently finds itself among the worthy
objectives rationalizing pursuit by the United States of regional FTAs. For
example, in encouraging passage of the Trade Act of 2002, which renewed
the authority of the President that had expired in 1994 to enter into trade
agreements, Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah argued that "America's
engagement in world affairs and trade can project our strengths and values.
Vigorous efforts to forge free trade alliances between the United States and
developing countries will help to foster respect for the rule of law,
competition and free-market principles in the developing world."'
To be sure, benevolent impulses no doubt float hopefully about this
objective. But at bottom the motivation is, understandably, to ensure that
U.S. companies can successfully - and safely - pursue export and
investment strategies in their chosen markets." In other words, when
10. 148 CONG. REC. S2627 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch); Trade Act
of 2002, §§ 2102(b)(5) & (6) 116 Stat. 933 (2002) (identifying transparency and anti-corruption
as principal negotiating objectives for future U.S. trade agreements).
11. See 149 CONG. REC. S9403 (daily ed. July 15, 2003) (statement of Pres. Bush on
transmitting legislation implementing the U.S.-Chile FTA). As former Canadian Ambassador to the
United States Derek Burney recently noted,
practical benefits can be derived from agreements that allow for greater
predictability and enable the flow of goods, services, and people to be less
vulnerable to capricious or politically tainted decisions. Essentially, I am talking
about the rule of law, instead of the rule of might, or the rule of the mighty.
Derek H. Burney, The Canada/U.S. Economic Relationship, 29 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 43, 46 (2003). On
a broader plane, foreign policy and even strategic considerations underlie promotion of the rule of
law, and FTAs enter as well into this equation, as witnessed by (among many possible examples)
the recent negotiation of an FTA with Morocco. U.S. Trade Representative Draft Text of United
States-Morocco FTA (Mar. 2, 2004), available at http://ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/
Morocco FTAiFInalText/SectionIndex.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2005); Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement with the United Arab Emirates (Mar. 15, 2004), at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/TradeAgreements/Regional/MEFTA/asset upload file305_3540.pdf. These nations do not
hold great promise for U.S. trade opportunities, but, as U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador
Robert F. Zoellick noted in announcing conclusion of the latter agreement and the second round
of FTA negotiations with Bahrain. U.S. and Bahrain Conclude Free Trade Agreement (May 27,
2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2004/May/U.S._
BahrainConcludeFreeTradeAgreement.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2005). "Expansion oftrade
with the United Arab Emirates is part of our efforts to promote democracy and economic vitality
[and promotes our strong partnership in our fight against terrorism] in the Middle East and the Gulf
Region." Id.; U.S. Trade Representative Press Release (Mar. 15, 2004), available at http://www.
ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2004/March/United States_UnitedArab_
Emirates Sign TIFA.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2005). Strategic considerations long have been
bruited for international trade: prevention of a third world war underlay the Bretton Woods troika
of global monetary, development, and trade disciplines following the Second World War. JOHN H.
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multinationals trade with or invest in lesser developed countries, they will
find a business-friendly environment with which they are familiar and
which will best ensure the success of their economic endeavors.
This self-interested premise need not be viewed as undermining the
value of fostering the rule of law through FTAs, any more than an
anthropomorphic basis for preserving a variety of animal or plant species
need detract from the importance of biodiversity. 12 While the precise
contours of measures chosen by a country to carry out either of these
policies will be affected by the actual purpose, the end product should be
the same. Successful advances to rules-based regimes, even if undertaken
to aid U.S. trade interests, nonetheless also will bring great benefits to the
citizens of our FTA partners, just as preservation of the rain forests in order
to stock our future medicine cabinets 3 equally will preserve species for
their own sake.
This Essay examines specific ways in which FTAs promote rules-based
governance in the Americas. We begin with an attempt to define our terms,
then acknowledge the "second best" nature of promoting the rule of law
through trade agreements by recognizing the primary role in this effort of
national governments through enforcement of domestic legislation. We
next explore particular aspects of the overarching transparency,
accountability, and due process umbrellas, as well as the timeliness,
impartiality, and record keeping stimuli of trade dispute settlement
systems, in the context of the major trade agreements in the hemisphere,
including MERCOSUR, NAFTA, the Andean Community, CARICOM,
and the Central American Common Market, as well as the recent FTA
JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS
AND TExT 199 (4th ed. 2002). As former Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota noted during
consideration of the Trade Act of 2002: "Expanding trade also offers national security and foreign
policy benefits because trade opens more than new markets. When it is done correctly, it opens the
way for democratic reforms. It also increases understanding and interdependence among nations,
and raises the cost of conflict." 148 CONG. REC. S2222 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Daschle). This Essay will not dwell on these strategic-military-security objectives, which have of
course become central drivers of FTAs for the United States following the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. See Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development and
Trade: Winning the War on Terror Without the War, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 587, 589 (2004).
12. See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, An Analysis of the Rights-Based Justificationfor Federal
Intervention in Environmental Regulation, 14 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 185, 186 (2003); Ajay
K. Sharma, The Global Loss ofBiodiversity: A Perspective in the Context of the Controversy Over
Intellectual Property Rights, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 5 (1995).
13. See generally Erin B. Newman, Note& Comment, Earth's Vanishing Medicine Cabinet:
Rain Forest Destruction and Its Impact on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 479
(1994); Rodger Schlickeisen, Protecting Biodiversity for Future Generations: An Argument for
Constitutional Amendment, 8 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 181, 186 (1994).
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between Chile and the United States and among a number of Central
American nations and the United States. We conclude with our preliminary
observations.
IV. MEANING OF "THE RULE OF LAW"
We begin by recognizing that international decision-makers - whether
in the realm of human rights, foreign policy, or international development
- often fail to articulate their understanding of "the rule of law" even as
they promote its cause. This lack of examination has led to an amorphous
concept capable of unqualified support from national security hawks and
human rights activists alike.'4
Most often, the confusion stems from a natural inclination to treat as
identical the procedural and substantive aspects of the rule of law. We may
see such formalities as open regulatory systems and independentjudiciaries
as tantamount to the government's respect for the views of civil society
and substantive due process, but one does not of course necessarily follow
the other.
"The philosophy of law has long been dominated by a disagreement
between those who say, with St. Augustine, 'that an unjust law is no law
at all,' and those who respond, with John Austin, that '[t]he existence of
law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. ""5 To be sure, observance
of the rule of law does not of itself guarantee its fair administration. In
practice, however, the correlation between implementation of the core
principles of the rule of law, discussed below, and advancement of the
human rights of citizens thereby regulated is strong and undeniable. While
"[i]t is important to preserve the distinction between law as an operative
system and justice as a moral ideal.... [l]aw is not necessarily just, but it
does promise justice."' 6 A rule of law makes government measures
predictable, which in turn allows citizens to plan their activities with some
degree of security. 7
In our view the rule of law's procedural and substantive components are
impossible to separate. In fact, as the University of Virginia's Rosa Brooks
14. ROSAE. BROOKS, THE NEW IMPERIALISM: VIOLENCE,NORMS AND THE RULE OF LAW 401,
403 n.5 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 03-20, 2003), revised by 101 MICH. L. REv.
401 (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=478382 (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
15. Jeremy Waldron, Does Law Promise Justice?, 17 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 759 (2001).
16. Id. (quoting PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE
PROMISE OF COMMUNrrY 443-44 (1992)).
17. Melissa Thomas, The Rule of Law in Western Thought, World Bank Group, available at
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/westem.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
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convincingly has observed, "creating the rule of law is most fundamentally
an issue of norm creation."' 8 Professor Brooks posits that the disappointing
results of dozens of projects to promote rules-based societies are primarily
the consequence of the sponsors' failure to address the complex
relationships between "law" and "norms" in a given country. 9
We believe that the rule of law is neither definable as a concept nor
accessible as an objective except within the context of specific cultural
premises and combined with the substantive norms that frame the concept
for use in a particular society. Specifically, the U.S. model, or Western-
based legal systems in general, may not be well suited to a legal system
based on Islamic civil law, such as Syria's, or one that derives from tribal
law, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo's, or even a Dutch-
French system such as that found in Suriname. :" Each country's unique
cultural heritage and values, whether in Ecuador or Canada or Nigeria,
must be considered in the search for "the rule of law."
Not only must any model for promoting the rule of law take careful and
explicit account of the cultural heritage of each country, but it must also
dispel the bitterly destructive impression that the rule of law concept is yet
another ploy by big countries to impose their will on the less mighty in
order to promote the big country's interests. An important aspect of
cultural heritage is Latin America's legal tradition of Roman or civil law,
which implicates the loss of sovereignty from FTAs felt by some civil
society groups.
Moreover, our analysis, premised as it is on the inevitability of
interaction between trade rules and human rights law, presupposes that the
rule of law concept is inseparable from the substantive norms of justice or
fairness. A government that promulgates clear, consistent, predictable, and
stable laws that deny human rights may be following the procedural
niceties of rules-based governance, but it is not adhering to the rule of
law.2"
In sum, we use the rule of law in a substantive sense to incorporate
formal justice that promotes liberty,22 and we recognize that our
conclusions have little meaning if they cannot be translated into cultural
18. BROOKS, supra note 14, at 410.
19. Id. To similar effect, Hemndez-Truyol observes that "different legal traditions have
divergent understandings of what the rule of law idea(l) is or should be." Hemndez-Truyol, supra
note 5, at 168.
20. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, THE WoRLD FACTBOOK, available at http://www.cia.
gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
21. See Hem.ndez-Truyol, supra note 5, at 172.
22. Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781, 787 (1989).
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norms comfortable to the country to which they would be applied. That
said, our experience has been that a working definition of the rule of law,
even one that emphasizes the law's procedural underpinnings, is essential
to this general study of the contribution of FTAs to human rights law. We
will, in presenting our findings, rely primarily on Joseph Raz's formalistic
approach, which identifies two primary components of the rule of law: that
citizens should be ruled by the law and obey it, and that the law must be
able to be followed.23
Raz expands on these two points by listing eight principles among those
that characterize a society applying the rule of law: (1) All laws should be
open, clear, and prospective. We cannot be guided by a law that does not
exist at the time of action, nor by one that is ambiguous. (2) Laws should
be relatively stable. Constantly-changing rules create the fear of ignorance
and make long-term planning impossible. (3) The making of laws
governing particular subjects should be guided by open, stable, clear, and
general rules. Health inspections, licensing decisions, and traffic
enforcement are among the many legal regimes that provide some
discretion to the decision-maker, and thus run counter to the basic ideal of
clear knowledge by citizens of the law. As a counterweight, such regimes
must be carried out according to a strict procedure that adds certainty. (4)
The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed. If courts act on
some other basis than the applicable law, the rule of law is thereby
nullified. (5) The principles of natural justice must be observed. Even in
Raz's "formalistic," procedural cookbook of ingredients in which the
"merit" of the law supposedly is irrelevant, the concept of fairness is
deemed essential to the rule of law. Law does, indeed, promise justice.24
(6) The courts should have review power over the implementation of the
other principles. The goal of such review is to ensure conformity with the
law at issue of both agency action and later law. (7) The courts should be
easily accessible. Even enlightened laws become dead letters in the face of
excessive costs and lengthy delays in the courts. (8) The discretion of the
crime-preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.
Misallocation of police resources to target a certain class or improper
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to overlook certain offenders
effectively subvert the rule of law.25 As will become apparent in our
23. Joseph Raz, The Rule ofLaw andlts Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND MORALIrrY 210, 213 (1979). "In the final analysis, the doctrine rests on its basic idea that the
law should be capable of providing effective guidance." Id. at 218.
24. Waldron, supra note 15; supra text accompanying note 16.
25. Raz, supra note 23, at 214-18.
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analysis, review of hemispheric FTAs will continually bring to mind Raz's
principles.
V. PRIMACY OF GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW
FTAs cannot of course directly inject rules-based governance into a
country. Only national governments can ensure the success of the rule of
law in their countries. As the responsible authorities in a democratic
nation, governments are charged with making and enforcing laws for their
citizens. Moreover, governments also are obliged to design and implement
their economic programs, including negotiating trade treaties, with the aim
of achieving the best results for the country and all its citizens. Outside
sources such as international treaties can have influence on the rule of law
only as implemented by governments - including legislative, executive,
and judicial authorities - in translating those treaties into conforiming
legislation, regulations, policy guidance, and administrative measures as
part of the government's agreement that the FTA's rule of law principles
contribute to those previously-set national objectives.
These actions have included dramatic reforms to the legal system. The
problems of "lack of independence, lack of control in the judicial system,
and lack of leadership," among others, led to the establishment of
"systems" which effectively contribute to the rule of law.26 Among these
systems are judicial training schools and an emphasis on financial self-
sufficiency of the courts.27
The laws themselves are not the problem. As Viancos states, "[t]he
problem here is enforcement. Laws are not being enforced." A main
contributing factor to the ineffective enforcement of the laws has been
technological. The system is functioning "as it was created to function five
hundred years ago" and it requires updating. Among the other
improvements ofjudicial institutions taking place, such as the restructuring
of the training of court staffers and new organizational design, the "great
emphasis on computer systems" arguably has become the most visible
feature. 28
Thus, when we suggest that regional FTAs may contribute to the rule
of law, we recognize that FTAs may do so only with the active indulgence
of the national governments that have subscribed to these international
26. Juan Enrique Vargas Viancos, The Vision for Reform and its Potential for Success, 16
FLA. J. INT'L L. 239, 241 (2004).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 242.
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contracts. These national governments, of course, drafted and agreed to the
terms that we will discuss as having secondary or tertiary effects on the
rule of law within the FTA partner countries and thus are well-situated to
bring them into effect.
Even so, the transparency, due process, and other human rights
principles of regional trade agreements may, we believe, have impacts on
the promotion of the rule of law that exceed both the drafting expectations
and the noble-minded hopes of their architects. Certainly it has been our
experience that FTAs markedly hasten progress toward the liberation of
civil society far beyond the expectations of the contracting governments.
Concerning the effect of NAFTA on Mexico's agency procedures, we
wrote in the day that
[t]he parties recognized that some risk attended the melding of
Mexico's civil law system.., with the common law system.., of
the other two NAFTA parties. The principal protection against an
adverse clash of systems was to ensure sufficient change to
Mexico's laws that the exporters of all three countries would be in
a roughly equivalent position. Essentially, this combination of
changes shifts Mexico several steps closer to a common law system
for antidumping and countervailing duty.29
We also observed at the time of NAFTA's ratification that "Mexico
will implement far-reaching reforms to guarantee due process and effective
judicial review...":
29. Stephen J. Powell& Mark A. Barnett, The Role of United States Trade Laws in Resolving
the Florida-Mexico Tomato Conflict, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 319, 357 (1997). The reference was to the
treaty's mechanism to draw back from a unique experiment in ceding judicial sovereignty to a
dispute settlement system for trade remedies that would be staffed not by judges, but by private
sector panelists. Concerning the broader impact of these changes to Mexican law on civil society,
we offered in a footnote that
[t]hrough such provisions as disclosure meetings, notices of intended action by
SECOFI [Ministry of Commerce], access to proprietary business information by
counsel under a protective order, detailed reasons for SECOFI decisions, and
elimination of the need to seek an administrative appeal before challenging a
SECOFI determination before a binational panel, Mexico's law was assured a
solid foundation in transparency and due process.
Id. at 357 n.233.
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In effect, Mexico has committed to bring its standards of
transparency up the level of its NAFTA partners in three ways -
Full participation in the administrative process by interested parties,
including by explicit timetables by Mexico for its actions, [a]
requirement that the administering authority . . . maintain a
complete administrative record, [providing] counsel [with] access
to everything in the record,... [and furnishing an] opportunity to
present facts and argument in support of their positions. Full
explanation by Mexico of its decisions... Full judicial review of all
administrative determinations ... without the present requirement
first to exhaust administrative remedies.., and with a standard of
review [ensuring] full examination of the legal and factual basis for
the determination . . . limited solely to evidence on the
administrative record.3 °
Evidence exists that not only in Mexico but also in Costa Rica and
Argentina, trade agreements have visibly improved rules-based governance
for civil society generally, especially through record keeping, transparency,
and timeliness provisions." China Supreme Court Justice Cao Jianming
has written that China's entry into the WTO will have a profound impact
on both the rule of law and judicial reform in China and that the country
is making progress toward these ends.32
When we suggest, therefore, that trade agreements may contribute to
the rule of law, we do so in the knowledge that only national governments
can make this suggestion a reality. Even though one could argue that the
need - or opportunity - for trade agreements to promote fair, rules-based
governance is a second-best solution, because national governments
already should have ample incentives to govern under a rule of law without
such artificial stimuli, that view may overlook political realities.
Just as job retraining aid and vigorous enforcement of trade remedies
(anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard laws) are recognized political
costs of continued steps to reduce protective trade barriers in the face of the
30. STEPHEN J. POWELL, INCREASED TRANSPARENCY AND DuE PROCESS IN MEXICO'S
ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DuTY LAW UNDER NAFTA, MEXICO - INVESTMENT AND
TRADE: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 403, 411 (1993).
31. Statements made by trade officials of these governments at the San Jose 2004 Conference
on Legal and Policy issues in the Americas on June 25, 2004 (notes, on file with the author). Ours
is, of course, but a theoretical analysis of the likely contribution of FTAs to the rule of law. We will
continue to search for methodologies and data bases that assist in approximating the actual impact
of FTAs on the rule of law in the Americas.
32. Cao Jianming, WTOandthe Rule ofLaw in China, 16 TEMP. INT'L& CoMP. L.J. 379,390
(2002). Justice Jianming was not, of course, addressing regional trade agreements.
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"outsourcing" ofjobs and the rough road to economic growth that are free
trade's companions,"3 national governments as well may take advantage of
the economic growth fostered by FTAs to justify changes to the status quo
toward rules-based governance that may upset existing power bases. In
some cases, second best may be the only course that is politically viable.
VI. TRADE AND TRANSPARENCY: PUBLICATION AND NOTIFICATION
The premise of this Essay is that international trade and, specifically,
FTAs not only promote economic growth, but also carry secondary benefits
to civil society's enjoyment of the rule of law. Economic welfare increases
dependently with rules-based governance through a process of openness,
stability, and predictability, which in turn promotes greater economic
growth by creating a business-friendly environment.34
In a fascinating study issued at the turn of the century, the Inter-
American Development Bank examined the relationship between
economic development and a series of factors reflecting the quality of
public institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean. The report began
by noting a paradox, that "[t]he region has the highest murder rates in the
world and shows any number of symptoms that reflect a lack of respect for
life and property[, y]et the region has moved to the forefront of the
developing world in terms of civil liberties and respect for democratic
rights."35
33. Paul Krugman, The Trade Tightrope, GAINESVmLLE SUN, Feb. 28,2004, at 9A; see Robert
J. Samuelson, China, Trade and Progress, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 2004, at 47; Stephen J. Powell &
Elizabeth C. Seastrum, Straight TalkA bout a Complex Issue: The U.S. Standard ofJudicial Review
of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1451, 1453
(1996) (discussing economic justifications for anti-dumping remedies). As former South Dakota
Senator Tom Daschle explained during consideration of the Trade Act of 2002, which expanded
trade adjustment assistance to farmers and other workers whose jobs are lost as a result of trade
agreements:
Expanded trade will provide billions and billions of dollars in economic growth
for the United States. Certainly, we can dedicate a small fraction of this gain to
those Americans who are harmed. It is the right thing to do. Frankly, it will be
impossible to build a broad consensus for expanded trade unless we do it right.
148 CONG. REc. S2222 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002) (statement of Sen. Daschle).
34. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, DEVELOPMENT BEYOND ECONOMICS: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA ch. 1 (2000) [hereinafter IADB Report 2000].
35. Id. at 13.
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A series of graphs illustrates the Bank's fundamental thesis: "[Public
i]nstitutions represent the formal and informal rules and practices by which
individuals relate with one another in order to attain economic and social
objectives. It stands to reason, then, that institutional quality and
development are largely synonymous. 36 Thus, the provisions in the studied
FTAs are not merely normative structures to regulate economic
relationships between the international actors: they also reflect a normative
trend of domestic practices.
The graphs that follow strikingly demonstrate "the close relationship
between overall governability and several indicators of economic and
social development. The countries with the highest levels of per capita
income and the best outcomes in health and education have public
institutions of outstanding quality."37
36. Id. at 23.
The most important institutions for development are those that ensure that people
and their enterprises can benefit from their productive efforts, which in turn makes
them more willing to invest in education, technology and physical capital. That
process entails protection of property rights, respect for the law and
for contractual commitments, and the absence of corruption.
Id.
37. Id. at 24.
The indicator used to measure governability is a combination of four indices that
reflect essential aspects of the quality of government and have been constructed
using information from many international rating sources that have emerged in
recent years (footnote omitted). The indices are the rule of law, control of
corruption, quality of the regulatory framework, and the effectiveness of public
administration. Figures 1.45a-d show the strong connection each of these
indicators has to per capita income.
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On the basis of these data, the World Bank concludes that "[i]n terms
of the rule of law and control of corruption, Latin America ranks lower
than any other region except Africa."38
As noted, this Essay concentrates on trade agreements negotiated
among nations in the Western Hemisphere. The reader should be aware
that every such FTA builds upon the global trade rules of the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the WTO that perfected
GATT's organizational structure half a century later and created an
advanced dispute settlement system substantially based on the rule of
law.39 The GATT and WTO agreements are the sub rosa understructure of
our examination of regional agreements.40
As to transparency, we see near universal agreement among
hemispheric FTAs that transparency through publication and notification
is essential to stability and predictability, which are in turn elements of a
market fundamental to trade. By examining the trade agreements, it is
possible to see that transparency translates into Raz's first principle, that
laws must be open, clear and prospective.4' Openness is of course aided by
publication of the laws and notification to interested parties of laws that
could potentially affect them.
A. Publication
Publication plainly promotes the first of Raz's principles.42 Publication
is the means by which governments communicate the law to the public,
which also promotes prospective application of rules by preventing
governments from applying hidden laws that did not exist at the time of an
action. Moreover, public notice of laws subjects them to the scrutiny of
interested parties. Examination and open application flesh out ambiguity
in the laws, thus promoting clarity.
38. Id. at 25.
39. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. Al1, T.IA.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M.
1226 (1994).
40. For an interesting argument from the perspective of a federalist scholar that global trade
rules contribute to domestic democracy by making trade restrictions more transparent and thus
obvious to average citizens, see John 0. McGinnis, World Trade Constitution, 114 HARv. L. REV.
511, 547-48 (2000).
41. Raz, supra note 23, at 214.
42. Id.
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In NAFTA, as well as in the U.S.-Central America Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA)4 3 signed in early 2004 between the United States and
the nations of the Central American Common Market' - Costa Rica,
Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua - and into which the
Dominican Republic was soon after integrated,45 these basic principles of
transparency are pervasive. CAFTA in particular aggressively promotes the
conditions we believe create secondary human rights effects.4 6 CAFTA
chapter 18 and similar provisions in NAFTA are the hub of a network of
transparency provisions fanned out into more specific chapters in each
treaty.
47
Specifically as to publication, these FTAs require in chapters 18 that the
parties make available to the public all laws and other binding rules and,
"to the extent possible," that they give interested parties opportunity for
input prior to enactment.48 Advance publication and an opportunity for
interested parties to have their voices heard are hallmarks of a transparent
lawmaking process. To be sure, the transparency facilitated by chapter 18
benefits foreign sellers and investors, but it decidedly also opens the
process of adopting those legal acts to domestic interested parties in civil
society and in this way assists governments in advancing the rule of law.
Although CAFTA chapter 18 explicitly addresses publication and
notification procedures, rule of law principles first are captured in the
treaty's objectives. The preamble fixes as goals for the agreement to ensure
43. U.S. Trade Representative Final Text of U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement
[hereinafter CAFTA], at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-
DRFinal Texts/SectionIndex.html.
44. General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, arts. XXII &
XXIII [hereinafter CACM].
45. U.S. Trade Representative Draft Text ofU.S.-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement
(Apr. 9,2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA-DR/CAFTA-
DR-FinalTexts/SectionIndex.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
46. The U.S. Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations has suggested that "[t]he
agreement meets or exceeds the negotiating achievements of the recently implemented Chile and
Singapore agreements, and in many ways has set the highest standard yet achieved in free trade
agreements," including in its anti-corruption provisions. Report of the Advisory Committee for
Trade Policy and Negotiations on the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA-DR/CAFTA 
-Reports/asset-
uploadfile367_5932.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2005). Rule of law principles can be observed
throughout the CAFTA; we have selected several illustrative provisions.
47. North American Free Trade Agreement, Oct 7, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Provisions that implement the principle of transparency appear
throughout NAFTA. See, e.g., id. arts. 510,909, 1036, 1411, Annexes 1010.1 & 11.37.4,32 I.L.M.
289, 358, 386, 653, 657, 613 & 639 (1993), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-
alena/men-en.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
48. Id. art. 1802(1), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M.. at 681; CAFTA, supra note 43, art. 18.2.
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a predictable commercial framework for business planning and investment,
to make customs procedures transparent and thus predictable, to create
opportunities for economic and social development, to promote
transparency, and to eliminate corruption.49 Additional publication
requirements supplement the broader preambular and chapter 18 objectives
of transparency through chapters for customs administration and trade
facilitation, which contain publication features for this field similar to
those in chapter 18.50 Article 9.3 ensures transparency in the government
procurement process through publication.5 Laws, regulations, invitations
to tender for procurements, relevant judicial decisions, and administrative
procurement rulings must be published. 2 Article 5.1 of CAFTA demands
publication on the Internet of customs laws, regulations, and general
administrative procedures,53 and also requires governments to designate a
contact point to entertain inquiries.54
CAFTA article 7.7 calls for greater transparency in the development of
technical regulations, such as those governing product safety or standard
product specifications.5 To achieve this objective, FTA members are
required, with respect to the notices already called for by the WTO
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,56 to describe the objective of
the proposal and the rationale for the approach the member is proposing,
and to transmit the proposal to the other members through the inquiry
points established under article 10 of the WTO Agreement. 7 To give
actual meaning to those obligations, the parties must also allow other
parties to participate in the development of technical regulations, in part by
allowing at least 60 days for comments. 8 To reaffirm the importance of
transparency in NAFTA, supplementary requirements that ensure
transparency also have been expressed in the specialized areas. Article
1306 relates to publication of measures for the telecommunications
49. CAFTA, supra note 43, pmbl. (enunciating the importance of transparency to ensure
predictability and to eliminate bribery and corruption).
50. Id. art. 5.1.
51. Id. art. 9.3.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 5.1.(1).
54. CAFTA, supra note 43, art. 5.1.(2)--(3).
55. Id. art. 7.7.
56. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994),
Annex 1, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL
TEXTS (THE LEGAL TEXTS) 139, 143, & 149 (WTO 1994).
57. CAFTA, supra note 43, art. 7.7(3)(b).
58. Id.
[Vol. 17
2005] REGIONAL ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS AND THE RULE OF LA WIN THE AMERICAS 79
industry." Article 1411 mandates publication of specific measures
regarding financial services.
60
Publication also is required by Article 718 for sanitary and
phytosanitary measures.6 ' Article 909 requires publication of the adoption
or modification of technical regulations. 62 In the field of government
procurement, entities must publish an invitation to participate in all
government procurements.63 Publication of arbitral awards under the
investor-state dispute settlement provisions of NAFTA chapter 11 is
permissible under article 1137.4.64 In 2001, the trade ministers of the
parties, sitting as the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, agreed to make
available to the public in a timely manner all nonconfidential documents
submitted to or issued by arbitration tribunals.65 Similar publication
provisions are scattered throughout the annexes, which contain the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (see Article 4) and
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (see Article 6).66
In the MERCOSUR 67 - the powerful Southern Cone Common Market
of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay - transparency promotes
stability and predictability through publication of agency actions in the
official journal. The Protocol of Ouro Preto establishes an administrative
secretariat which performs a number of transparency functions.6 This body
is the centralized location for official documentation. The Secretariat
collects information from the members regarding the measures taken to
implement decisions adopted by the other MERCOSUR organs, 69 thus
serving an instrumental role in ensuring the transparency and
59. NAFTA, supra note 47, at 653.
60. Id. at 657.
61. Id. at 368.
62. Id. at 386.
63. Id. at 613.
64. See NAFTA, supra note 47, art. 1137.4.
65. Free Trade Commission Clarification Related to NAFTA Chapter 11, para. A.2.(b) (July
31, 2001), available at http://www.naftalaw.org/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
66. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8-14,32 I.L.M. 1480,
1483 (1993). North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 8-14,32 I.L.M. 1499, 1503
(1993).
67. U.N. Doc. A/46/155, 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991).
68. Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of
MERCOSUR, Dec. 17, 1994, art. 31, 34 I.L.M. 1244 [hereinafter Protocol of Ouro Preto],
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/ourop/index.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
Under these provisions, the Secretariat is vested with autonomy equal to the other MERCOSUR
organs, the Council of the Common Market, the Common Market Group, the Trade Commission,
the Joint Parliamentary Commission, and the Economic-Social Consultative Forum.
69. Id. art 32, 34 I.L.M. 1255.
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accountability of MERCOSUR institutions. Centrally maintaining all the
official documents simplifies the process of requesting and obtaining
documents and promotes public scrutiny of the activities of government
agencies.
Each MERCOSUR member is required to maintain an official journal7
and must publish all decisions taken by MERCOSUR entities that have
entered into force, including resolutions of the Common Market Group
(the executive body which monitors compliance with the treaties),
directives of the Trade Commission, decisions of the Council, and dispute
settlement rulings.71
Directives promulgated by the MERCOSUR Trade Commission -
which helps the Common Market Group monitor application of trade
policy instruments - also find voice in the official journal.72 The
MERCOSUR Trade Commission considers and rules upon requests
submitted by the member states concerning application of and compliance
with the external tariff and other trade policies.73
In the Andean Community, a strong regional integration agreement
among Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, the General
Secretariat is the executive body and ensures transparency of operations of
the Andean Community institutions.74 Its duties include record keeping -
as depository for the other community organs - and publication of the
Official Gazette of the Cartagena Agreement.75
B. Notification
Notification relates to Raz's first and third rule of law principles.76
Notification suggests that the making of laws should be guided by open,
stable, clear, and general rules. The affirmative acts of identifying and
seeking parties that may materially be impacted by proposed laws exhibits
a dedication to openness - a step beyond simple publication of the law.
Moreover, such notification measures are often accompanied by an
opportunity to respond. Notification thus brings the parties that will
primarily be affected by the laws closer to the lawmaking process. Not only
70. Id. art. 32(11).
71. Id. art. 40, 34 I.L.M. 1255.
72. Id. art. 16, 34 I.L.M. 1251.
73. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 68, art. 19, 34 I.L.M. 1251.
74. Protocol of Trujillo Modifying the Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration
Agreement, Mar. 10, 1996, Bol., Colom., Ecuador, Peru, & Venez., art. 29 [hereinafter Protocol
of Trujillo].
75. Id. art. 30(k)-(m).
76. Raz, supra note 23, at 215-16.
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are the laws themselves opened to the public; so also is the process of
creating the laws, the essence of Raz's third rule of law principle.
Notification is another essential characteristic of transparency and, as
in the case of publication, chapter 18 is also the center of gravity from
which all notification provisions in NAFTA emanate." Article 1803
transmits the message that notification is fundamental to the administration
of the trade laws under NAFTA.78 The effects of notification are many and
its link to due process and fairness complex, as will be seen in later
sections.7 9 The differences in impact on civil society between publication
and notification can be dramatic. Notification requires the government to
take affirmative action to determine who might materially be affected by
a proposed measure, find them, and supply notice. Publication assists
citizens who have an incentive to seek out information; notification
eliminates the need for individuals to search out proposed measures that
may affect them.
Ancillary notification provisions are dispersed throughout NAFTA. In
articles 718 and 909, notification is linked closely to publication in
promoting transparency.80 These articles respectively require that a
government actor proposing to adopt or modify a sanitary or phytosanitary
measure or a technical regulation must supply written notice to interested
parties, thus supplementing the publication mandate of these articles.8 '
These provisions emphasize the different roles that publication and
notification play in promoting transparency. With regard to food and
product safety measures, it is considered inadequate to transparency simply
to require general publication.
Interested parties - even those who could potentially be most affected
by such a measure - may not even be aware of the existence of the
information without specific notification.
VII. TRADE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability is another principle of the rule of law echoed in
hemispheric trade agreements. Consistent with Raz's eighth principle, 82
accountability ensures that the discretion of the domestic governmental
institutions and the authorities established under the agreements are not
77. NAFTA, supra note 47, art. 1803, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 681.
78. Id.
79. Infra text accompanying notes 122-26.
80. NAFTA, supra note 47, arts. 718, 909, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 386.
81. Id.
82. Raz, supra note 23, at 218.
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allowed to pervert the law and frustrate its purpose. This corralling of
discretion is fulfilled through procedures that ensure creation and
maintenance of documents and the review and appeal of rules and
decisions made by authorities. As detailed in this section, Raz's eighth
principle is reflected by NAFTA chapter 18's creation of a means of
recourse from administrative decisions, by the subjection of decisions of
customs administrations to scrutiny under NAFTA chapter 5, the
MERCOSUR, and the Central American Common Market, and byNAFTA
chapter 19's extensive review procedures for agency actions under anti-
dumping and countervailing duty laws.
The creation and maintenance of documents improves both
transparency and accountability. There would be no documents to publish
and therefore no transparency if a legitimate system for keeping documents
were not in place. Moreover, creation and maintenance of a system of
documentation is fundamental to accountability. There would be little basis
for the accountability of customs officials and other administrative actors
absent some objective documentary basis for challenging their decisions.
A. Review and Appeal
Provisions that promote accountability of the decision-making bodies
can be observed throughout NAFTA and, again, chapter 18 is the hub.83
Article 1805 requires the establishment and maintenance of a mechanism
for review of administrative actions taken under the agreement.84 Review
and appeal procedures such as these ensure that the domestic
administrative decision-making bodies are held at least to a minimum level
of accountability, as well as helping to deter corruption and contribute to
due process by establishing the principle that rules are to be equitably
applied.
An equitable and efficient customs administration lies at the core of an
accountable trading system. NAFTA chapter 5 sets guidelines for the
administration of customs.8 Article 510 obligates each party to afford the
right of review and appeal of the various decisions of customs
administration, such as marking determinations of origin, country of origin
determinations, and advance rulings.86 There is also an instruction of equity
and national treatment. Article 510 expects these review and appeal rights
83. NAFTA, supra note 47, art. 1805, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 681; see, e.g., id. art. 510,
107 Stat. 2057, 31 I.L.M. 358.
84. Id. art. 1805, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 681.
85. See id. arts. 501-514, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 358.
86. See id. art. 510, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. at 358.
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to be the same as those afforded importers within the party's territory. 7
Parties must provide access to at least one level of administrative review
independent of the office that made the challenged determination and even
this review does not end the accountability provided.88 Article 510 also
mandates that thefinal level of administrative review be subject at least to
quasi-judicial appeal.89
Chapter 19 of NAFTA establishes the rules that must be followed to
invoke review of determinations made by a party under its anti-dumping
and countervailing duty laws.9° This chapter facilitates accountability on
several levels. First, the review mechanism itself represents an
accountability-ensuring principle at the highest level, because it holds
governments directly accountable to dispute settlement panels. Chapter 19
also mandates creation of an administrative record,9' which directly reflects
the importance of documentation and promotes accountability. And by
requiring that decisions of dispute panels be based on the administrative
record, chapter 19 exemplifies the necessity for objectivity and
accountability. Although there is no right to appeal the ruling of a
binational panel, another layer of accountability is provided.92 If actions of
a party prevent a panel decision from being implemented, a special
committee may be formed to safeguard the integrity of the panel process
by allowing the aggrieved party to suspend operation of the binational
panel system as to the offending party.93 NAFTA chapter 19 promotes
accountability through an additional review mechanism, one that allows
parties to test through dispute settlement whether an amendment to the
anti-dumping or countervailing duty laws is consistent with WTO rules
governing this trade field.94
MERCOSUR customs procedures provide that a party may challenge
the origin decisions made by another party.95 These procedures presuppose
the maintenance of a document system in order to justify the origin
87. Id. art. 510(1), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 358.
88. NAFTA, supra note 47, art. 510(2), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 L.M. 358.
89. Id
90. Id. art. 1904, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 682.
91. Id. art. 1904(2), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 682.
92. Id. art. 1904(11), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 682.
93. NAFTA, supra note 47, art. 1905, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 682.
94. Id. art. 1902, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 682.
95. Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal
Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay, and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991,
Annex II, art. 6, 30 I.L.M. 1041, 1054 (1991) [hereinafter MERCOSUR Treaty of Asunci6n],
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsr8.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
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decision and its exceptions.96 Origin decisions similarly may be reviewed
in the Andean Community through the General Secretariat. 97
In the MERCOSUR, functional and institutional accountability is
catalogued on a broader scale. Article 47 contemplates that parties will
review the institutional structure and the functions of each of its organs.9
The Andean Community contemplates this type of institutional
accountability as well. The Andean Presidential Council annually reviews
the actions taken by the bodies and institutions of the Andean Integration
System, in addition to their projects, programs, and suggestions.99
The MERCOSUR also contains a complaint procedure that is available
to state parties as well as to natural or legal persons.' 0 When a complaint
is filed, the MERCOSUR Trade Commission exercises its authority to
render decisions on the administration and application of the common
external tariff and the common trade policy instruments.'' The complaint
may also be reviewed by the Technical Committee if the Trade
Commission is not able promptly to decide the issues. 10 2 Therefore, in
addition to the accountability ensured by the complaint procedure itself,
review by the Technical Committee protects the integrity of the Trade
Commission decision that is ultimately rendered.
Article 5 of the Central American Common Market Agreement
(CACM) contains measures that establish a minimum level of
accountability and review relating to a customs officer's determination of
the country of origin. °3 That provision also allows a party to request
intervention of the Executive Council, which administers the treaty, to
verify the origin of an item if the origin of that item is uncertain and the
uncertainty cannot be resolved through bilateral negotiations.
96. Id. Annex II, art. 5, 301 I.L.M. 1054 (allowing an exception to the satisfaction of
requirements of origin when particular documentation can be presented, a "certificate informing the
importing State Party and the Common Market Group, together with any background information
and evidence justifying the issue of that document").
97. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, entered intoforce Oct. 16, 1969, art. 101,
28 I.L.M. 1165 (1989) [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement].
98. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 68, art. 47, 34 I.L.M. 1257.
99. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 97, art. 13. "The members of the Andean Council of
Foreign Ministers and of the Commission, and the representatives of the System bodies and
institutions, may attend the meetings of the Andean Presidential Council as observers." Id.
100. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 68, arts. 1 & 2, 34 I.L.M. 1258.
101. Id. art. 19, 34 I.L.M. 1251.
102. Id. art. 2, 34 I.L.M. 1258.
103. CACM, supra note 44, art. V.
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B. Documentation and Record Keeping
Both CAFTA and NAFTA promote accountability through record
keeping. Each agreement provides that parties must require importers and
exporters to create and maintain for at least five years documentation
establishing the origin of traded goods."° The customs procedures revolve
primarily around the certificate of origin, which is a fundamental
instrument that becomes the basis for the construction of the administrative
record of a particular trade transaction. Chapter 18 makes an administrative
record essential by requiring that it constitute the basis for a decision on
appeal. 105
Under chapter 19 of NAFTA, the Secretariat is responsible for
preparing and maintaining the record of an anti-dumping or countervailing
duty dispute settlement proceeding. 6 The Secretariat serves as a
centralized location to receive and file requests, briefs, and other papers
presented to a binational panel. 7 "Administrative record" is given a
special meaning, is made the basis for a panel's decision, and must be
transmitted by the agency directly to the panel. 108
NAFTA's chapter 10 establishes another system of record keeping that
supports government procurement operations. Article 1013 outlines the
documents that a government must include when it provides tender
documentation to suppliers,"° thereby furnishing to the public a benchmark
by which *the tender process may be observed to ensure its integrity.
CAFTA contains a similar provision regarding tender documentation. 10
The MERCOSUR requires that export documentation and the
certificate of origin must be maintained to support the reduction in duties
under the agreement."' Copies of certificates and corresponding
documents must also be kept for two years after their issuance." 2
As will be noted in greater detail below, both MERCOSUR's
alternative dispute resolution system and its formal system for resolving
disputes anticipate, without labeling it as such, construction of a record
104. NAFTA, supra note 47, art. 505, 107 Stat. 2057,32 I.L.M. 358; CAFTA, supra note 43,
art. 4.19, 556 I.L.M.
105. NAFTA, supra note 47, art. 1805(2)(b), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 681; CAFTA, supra
note 43, art. 18.5.2(b).
106. NAFTA, supra note 47, arts. 1908(2), 1908(3), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 682.
107. Id. art. 1908(3), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 682.
108. Id. arts. 1911, 1904(2) & 1904(14), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 682.
109. Id. art. 1013(1), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 613.
110. CAFTA, supra note 43, art. 9.6.
111. MERCOSUR Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 95, Annex II, arts. 11-12, 30 I.L.M. 1054.
112. Id. AnnexlI, art. 17.
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upon which a decision on the dispute will be based. 13 In order for the
MERCOSUR Council to perform one of its critical functions -
supervising implementation of the formative treaties, 1 4 - parties must
supply the Council with documentation of actions taken to comply with
their MERCOSUR obligations. Moreover, the Council's supervisory
authority presupposes the existence of some channel and means of
communication with the states. In fact, the formal institutional structure of
the MERCOSUR implicitly demands the existence of a system of
documentation and record keeping. In addition to Council supervision of
implementation of the various treaties of the common market, organs of the
MERCOSUR are asked to formulate new policies, make important
decisions, and promulgate procedures that will bind the parties." 5 The
governing entities simply could not perform their duties without a
substantial system both of communication and record keeping.
In the Caribbean Community. (CARICOM), an example of the
development and maintenance of a record is found in the rules controlling
a member's application of quantitative restrictions to imports that are
causing serious injury to domestic producers. The member must submit a
wide range of information regarding the producers allegedly being
harmed," 6 the product, the domestic market, the nature of the imports, and
the import protection being proposed." 7 These rigorous proof requirements
strongly promote maintenance of a record keeping system.
Indications of the need for an administrative record appear in other
hemispheric pacts. In the CACM, five copies of the customs form must be
created and the form referred to the Executive Council when there is a
dispute about the origin of the goods. 8 An explicit function of the General
Secretariat of the Andean Community is to serve as depository for the
records of meetings and other documents." 9
113. See Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 68, art. 2 (the Trade Commission shall, without
taking further action, pass on the "dossier" to a Technical Committee); Protocol of Brasilia for the
Solution of Controversies, Dec. 17, 1991, 36 I.L.M. 691, 693 available at
www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsrs/decisions/ANO 191 e.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
114. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 68, art. 8(I), 34 I.L.M. 1249.
115. Id. art. 1, 34 I.L.M. 1248.
116. Id. at 1253.
117. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the
CARICOM Single Market and Economy, Feb. 19, 1997, art. 92(5) [hereinafter CARICOM],
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/ccme/protocoll.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
118. CACM, supra note 44, Annex B, arts. III& V.
119. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 97, art. 30(l).
[Vol. 17
2005] REGIONAL ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS AND THE RULE OF LA WIN THE AMERICAS 87
VIII. TRADE AND DUE PROCESS
We noted earlier that a connotation of fairness accompanies this
Essay's treatment of rules-based governance. The incidents of due process
engineered by trade agreements evidence the core legal concept that
implements Raz's fifth principle of the rule of law, that of observing the
precepts of natural justice. 120 As Raz perceives, open and fair hearings, the
absence of bias, and other emoluments of natural justice not only stand as
principles of the rule of law in their own right, but also "are therefore
essential for the preservation of the rule of law" and thus the law's ability
to guide action. 121
Law interpreted on the basis of whim or simply in the absence of
knowing input from affected members of civil society is unlikely to be
correct either from the standpoint of legal construction or of judicial
credibility. The concept of due process ensures this correctness in law's
implementation and review and FTAs profoundly contribute to the
concept. Due process entails a range of considerations. We begin with the
basic notions of equity, notice, and time limits, and proceed to the more
advanced aspects of regularized procedures and codes of ethics.
A. Fairness - Equity, Notice, Public Participation, and Time Limits
NAFTA articles 1804 and 1805 are aimed at the heart of the classic due
process protections. Article 1804 establishes the minimum level of due
process that administrative proceedings must afford, including the
fundamental characteristics of reasonable notice: "a description of the
nature of the proceeding, a statement of the legal authority under which the
proceeding is initiated, and a general description of any issue in
controversy.',
122
In addition, NAFTA citizens must be "afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present facts and arguments in support of their positions
prior to any final administrative action.' ' 123 Similar assurances are provided
by article 1805 in the context of review and appeal procedures, including
"a reasonable opportunity to support or defend their respective positions"
and "a decision based on the evidence and submissions of record."' 24 A
parallel requirement appears in article 1904(2). The provision mandates
that a panel review of an anti-dumping or countervailing duty
120. Raz, supra note 23, at 217.
121. Id.
122. NAFTA, supra note 47, at 681.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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determination be based on the deciding agency's administrative record, as
exhaustively defined.'25
NAFTA chapter 19 contains other due process characteristics. A
panel's review is guided by detailed standards of review (depending on
what country's determination is under review).'26 These standards, together
with the need to base the decision on the administrative record, assure at
least a minimum level of objectivity and thus fairness.
Other due process requirements are that the request for panel review
must be in writing and transmitted to the other party involved in a timely
manner, which of course facilitates fairness by putting the opposing party
on notice of the challenge. The panel will follow detailed procedures set
down by the parties and each person affected has the right to appear and be
represented by counsel before the panel.'27
Chapter 17 ofNAFTA, which protects intellectual property, injects due
process standards directly into the domestic legal systems of the parties.
The chapter requires that the enforcement procedures parties must
incorporate into domestic law be fair and equitable.'28 Administrative
decisions, for their part, must be in writing, must be made available
without undue delay, and must be "based only on evidence in respect of
which such parties were offered the opportunity to be heard."' 2 9 Article
1715 is one of those powerful provisions that directly may change the
nature of domestic judicial review for all citizens, not solely foreign
exporters and investors. Parties undertake the obligation to provide
domestic judicial proceedings to enforce intellectual property rights. The
provision then sets down a laundry list of due process measures that must
be afforded in these proceedings. 3 Defendants have a right to written
notice that is timely.'3 ' Parties in such a proceeding are allowed
independent legal representation and are entitled to substantiate their
claims and present evidence. Their confidential information must be
protected.13
2
In addition to the due process rights directly accorded parties appearing
in the judicial proceedings, the courts themselves must be given a broad
125. Id. at 683.
126. Id.
127. NAFTA, supra note 47, at 683.
128. Id. at 676.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 677.
131. Id.
132. NAFTA, supra note 47, at 677.
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range of legal and equitable powers of a personal and in rem nature.'33
These comprehensive judicial powers forcefully implement Raz's fourth
and sixth principles of the rule of law by imparting to courts both clear
independence from the administrative bodies whose decisions they review,
and by ensuring that the judicial system has the means to enforce
implementation of the other rule of law principles.134
B. Regularized Proceedings
NAFTA chapter 19 provides a potpourri of procedural regularity,
toward institutionalizing the due process concept.'35 The theme of regular
procedings can as well be noted in MERCOSUR instruments. Specific
rules of internal procedure must be approved for operation of the Common
Market Group, the MERCOSUR Trade Commission, and the Socio-
Economic Advisory Forum. 1
3 6
CARICOM promotes routinization by setting down substantial and
explicit procedures for determination of dumping by national authorities.1
3 7
These procedures are further evidence of implementation of a rules based
system that promotes certainty and stability about what the law is and how
it will be applied.
In CAFTA, chapter 8's trade remedies provisions that regulate the
imposition of safeguard measures for temporary protection against surging
imports go to great lengths to guarantee due process protections. A series
of articles constrain and regulate the use of safeguard measures toward
consistent, impartial, and reasonable administration of each party's laws,
regulations, decisions, and rulings governing safeguards. 38 There is also
a mandate of fairness. The investigating authority that applies safeguard
measures must operate under equitable, timely, transparent, and effective
procedures and be subject to review by independent administrative or
judicial tribunals.'39
133. Id.
134. Raz, supra note 23, at 216-17.
135. NAFTA, supra note 47, art. 1904(14), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 682. The rules of
procedure for binational panel review must include, inter alia, the content and service of panel
requests, the manner of transmitting the administrative record to the panel, protection of privileged
information, participation by private persons, computation and extensions of time, the form and
content of briefs, and oral argument.
136. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 68, arts. 14(X), 19(XI), & 30, 34 I.L.M. 1251-55.
137. CARICOM, supra note 117, arts. 125-133.
138. CAFTA, supra note 43, art. 8.3(1).
139. Id. art. 8.3(2).
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C. Codes of Ethics
Most of the ethical steps taken to date relate to establishment of
procedures and increasing transparency and accountability. Procedures that
enhance transparency and accountability - for example, in customs
administration and government procurement - diminish the circumstances
that create the opportunity for irregular reimbursement by reducing the
discretionary authority given to government officials. 4 '
Bhala has observed that the problem of unethical activity is systemic in
developing countries. 14' As noted earlier, 142 irregular behavior of this
nature by government officials can directly translate into lessened
economic growth by citizens of the affected country. An effective first
phase of combating this problem is implementing procedures that promote
transparency. 143
The Treaty of Asuncion reflects MERCOSUR's overwhelming
sentiment to thwart corruption by requiring parties promptly to establish
a harmonized regime of administrative penalties for cases of false
certification, without prejudice to the corresponding criminal
proceedings."
NAFTA contemplates the establishment of a code of conduct for
panelists and members of committees established pursuant to the chapter
addressing trade remedies. 45 Section B of CAFTA chapter 18 (Anti-
Corruption) begins with a statement of principle that parties resolve to
eliminate bribery and corruption in international trade and investment, then
sets out explicit benchmarks parties must attain to achieve that statement
of principle. 146
CAFTA article 9.13 (Ensuring Integrity in Procurement Practices)
insists that each party maintain a system that would declare persons
ineligible to participate in the tender process if they are determined to have
engaged in fraudulent or other illegal activities in relation to
procurement.1
47
140. RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 818 (2d ed. 2001).
141. Id.
142. Supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
143. Bhala, supra note 140, at 818.
144. MERCOSUR Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 95, Annex II, art. 12, 30 I.L.M. 1057.
145. NAFTA, supra note 47, art. 1909, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 686.
146. CAFTA, supra note 43, art. 18.7-18.8.
147. Id. art 9.13.
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IX. CONTRIBUTION OF FTA DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS TO THE
RULE OF LAW
We recognize the existence of a degree of convergence between the
aspects of FTA dispute settlement systems that contribute to rules-based
governance and the contribution of FTA provisions explored earlier in this
Essay. Record keeping is perhaps the clearest example of this overlap.
We believe even so that the effects of dispute settlement are better
understood in a separate discussion. The indirect effects on civil society of
trade dispute settlement are generally more powerful and they operate in
a manner distinct from the effects of other provisions. We will attempt
cross references when that device appears helpful.
Much has been written about the problems both of independence and
timeliness in the judicial systems of developing nations in the hemisphere.
Advancements in efficiency and administration ofjustice, long viewed as
preconditions for private sector trade and development, have been difficult
to accomplish under existing legal frameworks. According to one author,
what was needed was an environment "conducive to trade, financing, and
investment," however, "[i]n the view of the [World] Bank, the Latin
American judiciary had become an impediment to these ambitious goals
due to its inefficiency, characterized by lengthy case delays, limited access
to justice, a lack of transparency and predictability, and poor public
confidence in the system.' ' 48
With an eye toward these areas of potential improvement, trade
agreements being implemented in the region now have strict timetables and
stricter methods for ensuring judicial impartiality. While a discussion of
judicial reform is beyond the scope of this Essay, the dispute resolution
chapters in hemispheric agreements indeed emphasize judicial
independence and accountability. Independence of the judiciary has been
defined as encompassing three indicators: "Detachment from interest
groups such as political parties, unwillingness to bend to the views of peers
within the judicial system (e.g., other judges, members of the Bar) and
independence from other governmental institutions.' 149
Another secondary effect of FTAs that has had a positive impact on the
rule of law ideal of accountability, reflected in Raz's sixth principle -
asserting that courts must have review powers over implementation of the
148. Joseph R. Thome, Heading South but Looking North: Globalization and Law Reform in
Latin America, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 691, 697 (2000).
149. Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America, 36
VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 172 (1995).
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other principles - is in the area of administrative record keeping. Records
are essential for the proper functioning of both businesses and
governments. Records have been viewed as absolutely necessary for the
rule of law, as they lead to accountability of the decision-makers and
transparency of the decision process.
From a somewhat broader perspective, the stability of national
regulations promoted by FTAs becomes an end in itself, because
predictability is one of the strongest motivators of businesses to trade with
and invest in a particular country. In order to continue the economic
growth stimulated by a predictable set of rules, nations may be encouraged
to pursue a more rules-based system of governance.
X. TRADE AND TIMELINESS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS
A. Time Limits
NAFTA has an elaborate system for dispute settlement that involves
separate structures for controversies involving anti-dumping and
countervailing duties, investment-related disputes, and challenges to labor
and environmental measures. Where none of these more specific
provisions applies, chapter 20 ofNAFTA controls the controversy through
its general dispute resolution mechanism.15 °
Timeliness is central to dispute settlement under NAFTA, with tight
deadlines established beginning with the length of required initial
consultations and extending to formation of a dispute panel and the
ultimate implementation of the panel's report. NAFTA's basic ninety-day
time period is repeated in MERCOSUR as the limit for the ad hoc tribunal
appointed to review a measure to issue its final decision, subject to further
review of the Permanent Revision Tribunal.151
In the Andean Community, the Court of Justice is responsible for the
annulment of decisions by community organs - the Council of Foreign
Ministers, the Commission, and the General Secretariat - found to have
rules of the Andean Community. In the interest of timeliness, a statute of
limitations limits requests for annulment to two years from the date of the
original decision. If a decision is annulled, the affected Andean
150. Protocol of Brasilia for the Solution of Controversies, Dec. 17, 1991, art. 20.
151. Id.
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Community body must ensure that the judgment effectively is fulfilled
within the time frame mandated by the Court of Justice. 
15 2
Because this review procedure may be pursued not only by member
states, but also by natural or artificial persons within the Andean
Community whose rights have been affected, as an alternative to filing suit
in domestic courts, these timeliness dictates have broadly positive
implications for civil society as a whole with respect to a wide range of
activities that maybe undertaken by Andean Community governing bodies.
These provisions strongly support Raz's seventh principle by making
review of government action more accessible by reducing delays.'53
CARICOM's dispute settlement procedures insist on an earnest attempt
at an expeditious resolution of conflict through "good offices, mediation,
consultations, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication," and set detailed
time lines for each of these stages in the conflict resolution process,
including ultimate review by the Caribbean Court of Justice.154
The CACM agreement makes little reference to dispute settlement.
Although the pact calls for arbitration to settle "any differences which may
arise regarding the interpretation or application of any of [the treaty's]
clauses" that cannot be resolved by amicable settlement, the formalities
and insistence on rule of law principles such as those found in CARICOM
are missing. 155
Dispute settlement procedures under CAFTA, which are identical to
those found in the U.S.-Chile FTA, 156 make available to parties that find
themselves at conflict over terms of or actions taken under the FTA the full
spectrum of resolution alternatives, and set strict deadlines for each stage,
including explicit treatment of compliance review by the original panel. 5
152. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, May 28, 1979, ch. 111,
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/Junac/Tribunal/cartageA.asp (last visited Mar. 16,
2005).
153. Raz, supra note 23, at 217.
154. Protocol Amending the Treating Establishing the Caribbean Community, Protocol IX:
Dispute Settlement, arts. 3-10(c) & 12 [hereinafter CARICOM Dispute Settlement Protocol],
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/ccme/protoc9a.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
155. CACM, supra note 44, art. XXVI.
156. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, available at http://www.ustr.
gov/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Chile-FTA/Final-Texts/Section-Index.html (last visited Mar. 16,
2005).
157. CAFTA, supra note 43, ch. 20 (Dispute Settlement).
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B. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
CAFTA adds a groundbreaking additional requirement whose
effectuation inevitably will lead to an increase in access to justice and
timeliness of decisions for the citizens of CAFTA countries, whether or not
they are involved in international trade. The treaty calls for maximum
efforts by parties to facilitate ADR systems - as options not only to
domestic courts, but also to the FTA's own dispute mechanisms - for
resolution of commercial disputes, and specifies the particular framework
that such systems should emulate."l 8
The 1990s have witnessed a strong movement in the Americas to
resolve disputes through ADR. 15 9 Actions include Nicaragua's 1994
decision to include a permanent mediation office with the Law School at
the National University of Nicaragua in Leon, which supervises forty cases
per month, and Argentina's 1991 National Mediation Plan.60
Like provisions of FTAs that require review in the parties' domestic
courts of a treaty provision's implementation, 16 requirements to fashion
additional domestic procedures for the review both of agency action and
private behavior will relieve crowded judicial dockets, thereby directly
influencing Raz's seventh principle - access to courts - with respect to
civil society in general. A potential further effect is that once these systems
are fully operational and meet the anticipated international standards, an
increase in their scope beyond commercial disputes becomes substantially
more achievable.
158. Id. art. 20.22. Parties are deemed in compliance if they have acceded to and are in
compliance with either the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards or the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration. Id. art. 20.22(3).
159. Thomas J. Moyer & Emily S. Haynes, Mediation as a Catalyst for Judicial Reform in
Latin America, 18 01110 ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 619, 625-37 (2003). Argentina's program
experienced a particularly strong start. Within a year, Argentina had certified 60 mediators and by
1995 a statutory mandatory mediation procedure, which does require representation by counsel, was
in place. Even with the required representation, this has been seen as an improvement over the
traditional court system as the "[parties] are still better off financially if they settle and avoid
endless delays and expenses of litigation." In 1997 the Mediation Center expanded to include a
Community Mediation Program in Buenos Aires. The proposed goal included "hannoniz[ing]
neighborly coexistence, improv[ing the] quality of life, and creat[ing] a change in attitudes" and,
through their conflict resolution programs in primary and secondary schools, "strengthen[ing]
democratic and participatory values." Id. at 661 (quoting Marcela Valente, Rights-Argentina:
Mediation Resolves Neighborhood Conflicts, Inter Press Serv. (Sept. 15, 1999), 1999 WL
27374020).
160. Id. at 661.
161. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 47, art. 1714(1).
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Examples such as CAFTA's ADR provision show most clearly the rule
of law ideals promoted in FTAs. While many do not mandate directly such
reforms of domestic judicial systems, the requirements for record keeping,
public notice, written rationale for decisions, and overall timeliness for
each stage of dispute resolution promote the honesty, integrity, and
efficiency that are so important to the level playing field that exists under
the rule of law.
XI. TRADE AND IMPARTIALITY
Under NAFTA, substantial efforts are made to protect the impartiality
of dispute panelists. This objective manifests itself in a number of ways,
starting with creation of the panel. Under the general dispute settlement
procedures of chapter 20, a panel of five arbitrators is constituted from a
standing roster of individuals previously chosen by the three NAFTA
parties. The chair of the panel is either mutually agreed or chosen by the
winner of a coin toss within fifteen days of the request for the formation of
the panel. In the next fifteen days, each party is to name two panelists from
the opposing party. 1
62
There are a number of similarities between the provisions of NAFTA
and MERCOSUR. Under the most recent MERCOSUR protocol dealing
with dispute resolution, which regulates disputes between member states
as well as those of private parties against member states, one arbitrator for
the three-person ad hoc tribunal is selected by each member from a roster
drawn by the opposing party, with the third being mutually agreed. As
ways to address impartiality, the third arbitrator may not be a citizen of
either disputing country and this arbitrator acts as president of the
tribunal.'63
The objective to ensure impartiality by balancing the dispute resolution
body from among member nations also is pursued by the Andean
Community for its Court of Justice, which interprets community laws for
uniformity and otherwise settles disputes. The Court has five judges, each
from a different member state. The treaty enjoins that judges must "enjoy
full independence to exercise their duties" and, as a further means of
ensuring impartiality, prohibits judges from performing "other professional
162. Id. art. 2011(1).
163. Protocol of Brasilia for the Solution of Controversies, supra note 113, art. 9.2; Maria A.
R. Lemmo, Study of Selected International Dispute Resolution Regimes, with an Analysis of the
Decisions of the Court ofJustice ofthe Andean Community, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 863,883
(2002) (discussing various FTA dispute settlement regimes).
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activities," either paid or free of charge, except for teaching [and] any act
that is incompatible with the nature of their position."
Similar protections of the impartiality of panelists are found under
CARICOM, whether the settlement of disputes is pursued through
conciliation or arbitration. '65 Along these same lines, the chair of a CAFTA
dispute panel may not be a national of the disputing parties absent their
agreement, and twelve of the sixty pre-selected panelist roster candidates
may actually be nationals of non-parties, a strong vote for impartiality. 166
XII. TRADE AND RECORD KEEPING
Because a dispute settlement panel normally must be given access to all
or most of the administrative record upon which the decision was based in
order to determine the relationship between the challenged measure and the
FTA's obligations, proper record keeping becomes crucial. The creation of
an administrative record anticipates, for example, that evidence upon
which the decision is based explicitly identified and placed in the file of
the measure.
This necessity of recording evidence holds equally true for the methods
of analysis made by the agency, which serves greatly to reduce the
potential for arbitrariness because the record increases the ability for future
review of such things as "job performance, actions or omissions of specific
judges in specific cases"; the advent of improved record keeping serves as
a barrier to these potential sources of "excessive discretion" in the
judiciary. 167
FTA dispute settlement systems make decisions of national authorities
affecting importers and investors subject to close scrutiny, including
through reviews by entities that are independent of the agency that made
the decision. Knowledge of this strict review may have a positive effect on
164. TREATY CREATING THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY (AS AMENDED
BY THE COCHABAMBA PROTOCOL), Aug. 25, 1999, Bol., Colom., Ecuador, Peru, Venez., arts. 6-8,
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/Junac/TribunalfrratModi.asp (last visited Mar. 16,
2005); THOMAS A. O'KEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS app. 23-1 (2004).
165. CARICOM Dispute Settlement Protocol, supra note 154, arts. 8-10. In conciliation, the
disputing members each appoint one conciliator, then must either agree on the third or ask the
Secretary-General to make the appointment from a pre-existing list. During arbitration, as far as
practicable no arbitrators are to be members of the disputing nations and not be affiliated with or
take instructions from any member state. Id.
166. CAFTA, supra note 43, arts. 20.7 & 20.9.
167. Maria GonzAlez de Asis, Anticorruption Reform in Rule of Law Programs 10, at
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/35977/asis-ac-rol.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
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a government's decision-making process, as any potential misuse of
authority will be exposed on an international level.
This effect would seem particularly important where obligations arising
out of the FTA require that national authorities follow markedly different
decisional processes than previously required by domestic law. Together,
the dispute settlement attributes of timeliness, impartiality, and record
keeping may aid the government's measures to transform the decision
process into a rules-based operation, rather than one that may flow from
changing opinions of agency officials alone.
Although normally only trading interests are expressly benefitted by an
FTA, the creation of an administrative record almost always results in
greater openness in the decision process for all affected interests, both
foreign and domestic. The dispute settlement mechanisms of FTAs may
serve also as alternatives for foreign interests to less developed judicial
systems in smaller economies, and even potentially as a framework for
reform for less robust court systems. A positive example such as the
elimination of nationalism or other bias in reviewing whether a border
measure is consistent with the FTA's obligations promotes a rule-based
approach to the regulatory process in general.
XII. CONCLUSIONS, AND MORE QUESTIONS
Provisions in regional economic arrangements that encourage
transparency, accountability, and due process by governments, as well as
dispute settlement systems in FTAs that promote timeliness, inclusive
record keeping, and impartiality in the administrative decisional process
seem powerful allies to right-minded governments interested in
supplemental avenues to advance for their citizens the rule of law, by
which we mean formal justice that promotes liberty.
The notice, publication, timeliness, and record keeping provisions of
FTAs, in particular, seem to have outsized effects in promoting rules-based
governance. As Minister Lnbet remarked at the start of this Essay, and she
accurately reflects my own observations over two decades, these
requirements have the effect of turning a mirror onto the process of
government itself, revealing its strengths and weaknesses at once both to
public officials and to their constituencies, often with positive effects on
the lawmaking process that could not have been predicted even by the
officials who negotiated the provisions. They institutionalize measures the
government already is taking to advance the rule of law, thus serving as the
government's conscience and relief force.
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One may ask whether the Inter-American Development Bank graphs, '68
which posit that Latin America ranks low in rule of law and other
governance factors, put the lie to this Essay's basic premise in light of the
proliferation of FTAs in the Americas. Perhaps, but our own view is that
the data reflect that, although the Americas has witnessed economic
integration efforts since at least the 1950s, until the 1990s these attempts
at free trade have yielded to protectionist economic policies. 6 9 The jury is
still out on whether FTAs in the hemisphere have had noticeable impact on
rules-based governance. Studies by Paul Zak of Claremont Graduate
University, in association with his collaborator at the World Bank, Stephen
Knack, in the new science of neuroeconomics, which searches for
biological bases for economic phenomena, also give the present author
cause for optimism. Their pioneering study concludes that trust levels (as
in "Do you trust strangers?") vary greatly between societies and is strongly
correlated with economic growth. As the authors explain, "Trust is one of
the most powerful factors affecting a country's economic health. Where
trust is low, individuals and organisations are more wary about engaging
in financial transactions, which tends to depress the national economy."' 7 °
Trust is higher in more economically homogeneous societies where legal
mechanisms for constraining opportunism are better developed. High-trust
societies, in turn, exhibit higher rates of investment and growth.' 7' FTAs
promote the indicators of higher trust by creating a more predictable civil
society environment, including the business environment, overseen by
conscientious governments practicing rules-based governance. These
conditions bode well for increasing trust levels in the Americas and
economic growth with them.
Since the so-called "Battle in Seattle" in 1999, globalization's
opponents have confirmed that a broadly representative segment of civil
society unshakably believes that trade agreements, far from being allies of
human rights advocates, in fact weaken labor, health, education, and other
human rights, as well as lessen the power of governments to protect against
adverse environmental and health effects and to provide affordable
168. Supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
169. See O'KEEFE, supra note 164, at 1-1.
170. Ken Grimes, To Trust is Human, 178 NEW SCIENTIST 32, 36 (May 10, 2003), available
at http://fac.cgu.edu/-zakp/media/Newsci.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
171. Paul J. Zak & Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, SOC. SC. RES. NETWORK, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=136961 (last visited Mar. 16, 2005); see also
The New Science of Decision Making: It's Not as Rational as You Think, NEWSWEEK, July 5, 2004,
at 46-47.
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infrastructure services such as telecommunications and electricity. 17 2 These
civil society members would be highly unlikely to accept the proposition
that FTAs promote rules-based governance. On the other hand, the fact that
these groups demand explicit provisions in FTAs protecting human rights
priorities leaves little room for acceptance of subtle, incidental effects on
human rights concepts.
Even if trade negotiators accept this Essay's thesis, many questions
make its immediate application problematic. For example, what steps
should negotiators take to account for the specific cultural premises and
substantive norms that frame the rule of law concept for use in a particular
society? Is it realistic to expect that one could discover a confluence of
such premises and norms within a region, for example, Central America or
the Caribbean, so that regional negotiations may be undertaken among
trading blocs, or must each country be addressed separately?
At bottom, we may ask, are trade agreements, despite their importance
to society as mechanisms to spur economic growth, simply unsuited as
instruments to improve human rights for civil society in general, because
the meat and bones of trade treaties lie in reducing barriers to open trade
through nondiscrimination principles, when we know that most human
rights priorities use discrimination as their most powerful avenue of
enforcement?173
172. See STEVE CHARNOVITz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, in TRADE LAW
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 495, 512 (2002).
173. STEVE CHARNOVrrz, Competitiveness, Harmonization, and the Global Economy, in
TRADE LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 172, at 191,208.
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